The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 47
Number 3 Parameters Autumn 2017

Article 12

Fall 9-1-2017

Book Reviews
USAWC Press

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
USAWC Press, "Book Reviews," Parameters 47, no. 3 (2017), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2877.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Book Reviews
Irregular Warfare
Tough Sell: Fighting the Media War in Iraq
By Tom Basile
Reviewed by James P. Farwell, National Security Expert; Associate Fellow,
Department of War Studies, Kings College, London, and author of Persuasion
and Power (Georgetown University Press, 2012)

T

om Basile’s Tough Sell: Fighting the Media War in Iraq is really two
books. The first two-thirds of the book offers invaluable insights on
the first two years of the Second Persian Gulf War, relating Basile’s firsthand experiences on the ground in Baghdad as a key player in the strategy
communication shop of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The final
third is a polemic defending the decision made by the administration
of US President George W. Bush to fight the war—a war even Bush
has questioned.
Basile’s conceptual discussion about everything from strategic
communication to ground realities make the book worth reading. Many
challenges confront a military-civilian force attempting to establish and
maintain message discipline and consistency. The cultures are competitive
and finding the right balance is tough. Civilians tend to be more flexible,
while the military decision-making process is bureaucratic. Soldiers are
permitted to speak to the press. In Basile’s view, military personnel can
get the facts wrong, make assertions that lack context, and inadvertently
undercut the mission. His analysis of these challenges is incisive.
Basile, is extremely critical of the media coverage of US efforts in
the Iraq War. He believes most of the press assigned to cover the war
knew nothing, made inadequate attempts to get the facts, and had a
strong anti-US bias. Perhaps. But “Rule 101” in media training presumes
the press knows little or nothing about a topic. This lack of knowledge
by the media is a continuing challenge for strategic communicators
everywhere. The lesson is communication strategies in a conflict zone
should anticipate and plan for the possibility—and in the author’s view,
the probability—that the media will spotlight small problems and ignore
major successes.
Some of the problems the author and others in the Coalition
Provisional Authority experienced when dealing with the media
emanated from the blowback occurring when the Authority revealed
Bush’s rationale for going to war—eliminating Saddam Hussein’s
weapons of mass destruction—came up short. That challenge eviscerated
Bush’s credibility on the war, and affected war reporting on the ground,
as journalists began questioning what the United States government
was doing and how well. Basile’s detailed account of forging and
executing a communication strategy offers powerful lessons for strategic
communicators operating in foreign cultures, especially in nations ruled
by dictators. Hussein had hollowed out Iraq. The coalition had to help
Iraqis rebuild everything—from hospitals and sewage treatment plants
to a new police force—from scratch.
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Basile argues that in surmounting such a stiff challenge, Paul Bremer,
the chief executive authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
and his team got a lot done with scant credit from the media for their
work. Basile also challenges top journalists like Rajiv Chandrasekaran,
whose Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone (2006) was
highly critical of the Authority. Smart people often interpret events very
differently. Basile shows the need to hear all sides of the argument.
Basile goes too far, though, in identifying a need to define words like
“win” and “success” a game aimed at managing expectations. Successful
strategy—whether communication, military, or political—requires
defining a desired outcome or end state from which follow strategy,
operations, plans, tactics, and metrics. In early 2003, General David
Petraeus famously told journalist Rick Atkinson: “Tell me how this
ends.” Linda Robinson wrote a fine book using this quote, Tell Me How
This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (2008).
Petraeus was correct.
Basile’s view that Bremer correctly disbanded the Iraq Army will
surely spark discussion. George Packer, in The Assassins’ Gate: America in
Iraq (2005), and others, citing military sources, argue the decision was a
debacle that led directly to the current problems. Any book like this will
ignite debates at all levels.
Basile merits high credit for his patriotic service and his thoughtprovoking book that provides keen insights into what it takes to make
strategic communication in war zones a success and into the obstacles to
good strategic communication. Tough Sell is highly recommended.

Counter Jihad: America’s Military Experience in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria
By Brian Glyn Williams
Reviewed by Robert L. Bateman, Fellow, International Security Program,
New America

Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2017
400 pages
$39.95

I

t has long been a truism that journalists write the “first draft of
history.” In many ways this is true. Yet as is the case with all early
reports, whether they come from a light infantry scout platoon, a Special
Forces unit conducting strategic reconnaissance, or initial assessments of
satellite or voice intercepts, the initial reports of journalists are often just
that, “first drafts.” History, solid history, requires time.
There are several reasons for this, easily understood upon
brief reflection. First, it takes time to assemble the vast quantities of
information needed to write a solid work of history. Second, time allows
the passions of the moment to fade and hopefully provides the scholar
the chance to examine any issue or era with something approaching
neutrality. Participants themselves become less engaged, and hopefully
with mellowing (and the judicious assistance of personal notes that
might have been written at the time) can themselves see the events they
witnessed with a more critical eye. And finally, of course, when dealing
with military history there is the issue of declassification of documents,
a critical element when trying to reconstruct a cohesive and hopefully
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comprehensive account of events. For all of these reasons academic
military historians generally consider “real” history impossible for at
least 20–25 years after the events took place.
In Counter Jihad Brian Glyn Williams is deliberately attempting to
split the difference between the “first draft” of history and pure history
itself. In effect his book is a serious attempt to write a “second draft of
history.” In this it appears he has done solid work, as far as it can be done
at this point. As an individual, Williams is in a somewhat curious position,
but one that places him well in undertaking such a work. An academic
(a professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts) he
understands the rigorous requirements that must apply to any serious
work of academic scholarship. As a former contract employee of the
CIA, tasked with tracking suicide bombers in Afghanistan in 2007, he
understands both the military culture and the environment of war at
several levels. As a professor who believes in being a teacher not just
being an academic confined to mere research he also had a personal
motivation: many of his students today were grade school children on
September 11, 2001 and have no real idea of what happened through
much of the first decade of this century.
It is worth quoting his stated objective in part: “My aim is to shine
a retrospective light on the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in order
to ‘historicize’ the disparate events once collectively known as the War
on Terror. The objective is to weave all these disjointed stories together
into one accessible narrative that tells us how we got to the point where
ISIS conquered an area in the Middle East larger than Britain or Israel
with eight million people living under its rule.”
In this Williams has made quite a good start. There are, of course,
gaps that may leave some dissatisfied. These, like all works, are as much
a product of the person writing the book as they are of the perceptions
of the readers.
Williams’ personal experiences in Afghanistan came in no small
part from his experience as an expert on Islamic culture and history
but also as a product of one of his earlier books, a biography on Afghan
leader Abdul Rashid Dostum. It is perhaps as a result of this that his
coverage of Iraq is less in-depth than some might like. The run-up to
the war in Iraq is explained in detail, most especially the politically
motivated manipulation and deliberate misreading of Iraqi capabilities
in NBC issues and blatant lies regarding ties between al-Qaeda and Iraq.
But post-Invasion Iraq, essentially the core of the war there between
2004–10, is glossed over in just 52 pages. Though I would also suggest
that this may be at least a little understandable since a real study would
require a book some 1,000 pages longer at least. (For this we shall have
to wait for the Center of Military History to produce the Tan Books.)
All in all, the book holds up well. Not as detailed as works such
as Tom Ricks’ Fiasco, nor as lightweight as some other brief accounts
of either war. For the specifics of military campaigns or battles during
our longest wars one should look elsewhere. But if you are trying to
find a decent single-source narrative of how we got here, Counter Jihad
accomplishes much of its stated intent, to present a concise single source
“second draft” of history.
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Los Zetas Inc.
By Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

T
Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2017
400 pages
$29.95

he author of Los Zetas Inc.: Criminal Corporations, Energy, and Civil War
in Mexico, Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, is an associate professor at the
University of Texas, Rio Grande Valley in Brownsville. In late 2006, her
family was threatened with extortion by the Zetas and was forced to flee
their farmlands, resulting in her moving from Matamoros, Tamaulipas
to resettle over the border in the United States in August 2009. Derived
from her family’s harrowing experience with the Zetas firsthand—which
undoubtedly influenced her ensuing academic research interests—a
number of arguments are put forth in this work. Her propositions
include “the recent violent conflict in Mexico has its origins in a new
criminal model introduced by the Zetas” and the main hypothesis “that
this new criminal model and government reactions to it mostly benefit
transnational corporate capital” both licit and illicit alike (3, 5).
To address these arguments, a new theoretical framework—
drawing upon business administration perceptions—was developed
that discusses the Zetas transitioning “from a freewheeling criminal
organization to a ‘business,’ albeit one that produces revenue for its
stakeholders though illicit activities and the violence that it uses to
intimidate both its competitors and adversaries” (5). This sets the stage
for exploring the Zetas militarization, responding governmental security
strategy militarization, ensuing societal militarization, and the resulting
impacts on the hydrocarbon industry and energy sector reform.
The book itself contains an introduction, nine chapters, and a
conclusion, as well as numerous maps, tables and figures, an abbreviation
listing, acknowledgements, five appendices, notes, references, and an
index. The work’s chapters are divided into thematic sections titled—
The Zetas: Criminal Paramilitaries in a Transnational Business, Mexico’s Drug
War: A Modern Civil War?, and Los Zetas Incorporated. The work—spanning
six years of research and writing—is primarily academic in orientation
rather than defense community professional focused. As a result, while
exceptionally well crafted—with on the ground research and interviews
of over one hundred individuals on both sides of the border and the
extensive use of both Spanish and English sources—the theoretical
discussions, author arguments, and citations woven into it make for
a very dense compression of information throughout. Of particular
interest is how the work balances its analysis with concerns over pseudoconspiracy allegations—multinational corporation premeditation vs.
political economy structural change—and criminal gang and cartel
socio-environmental modification of areas under their suzerain (e.g.
regions of narcotics impunity within the state) (215). What is striking in
the work is how it reinforces recent scholarship in the defense theorist
community related to criminal and plutocratic insurgency constructs—
the twin insurgencies mode—as a component of dark (and deviant)
globalization studies. Such mutual reinforcement is significant given
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the lack of cross-pollination between the new civil wars (academic) and
criminal insurgencies (defense) literatures.
Detractions to the work are twofold. An initial one—while
relatively minor—pertains to the characterization of the late Dr.
George Grayson’s use of “hyperbolic language” in characterizing the
Zetas (10). Grayson, a respected academic, was an early researcher on
the Zetas who published a number of significant monographs and books
including The Executioner’s Men in 2012 (with Samuel Logan). While he
indeed gets colorful in his language related to the Zetas sociopathic
behaviors in his later work, the sense this reviewer gets is that CorreaCabrera’s academic sensitivities are more offended by Grayson’s mention
of victim castrations and the skinning of their bodies while still alive
(which has been an active component of their psychological operations
program) than Grayson’s perceived lack of knowledge about the Zetas
brutality motivators (10).
The second, larger detraction focuses on her assertion that the
Calderon administration’s militarization policy against the cartels
“in which the military and federal police were sent to perform the
duties of state and local police” was a “radical response” (107, 108). This
is an unfair characterization of the Calderon administration’s policies
because it had no other choice than to directly bring federal assets into
the widening criminal insurgency taking place. The Zetas and the other
cartels had by the time of his election penetrated and co-opted entire
local and state law enforcement agencies—as well as judicial and political
bodies—which resulted in sovereign Mexican territories de facto being
lost to what essentially were militarized criminal entities. That CorreaCabrera does not provide viable alternative suggestions to the Calderon
administration’s security policies she criticizes underlies the fact that the
“hubris of the academy” permeates some sections of her work.
Still, these detractions do not obscure the fact that the other 99
percent of the work—that is, the overall arguments it presents and
information provided in support of them—are first rate. Los Zetas Inc.
very much represents an important addition to research on the Zetas
cartel as well as that on the narcotic wars viewed from the perspective of
the new civil wars literature. It underlines the metastasis of the conflict
from purely narcotics trafficking routes and plazas into territorial
control of regions with great hydrocarbon wealth as well as that of other
natural resources such as timber and iron ore. In summation, this “dark
globalization” type work should be treated as an excellent resource on
the Zetas, including presenting future trajectories for the group and
its factions (e.g. the discussion of four successful business models in
the conclusion), highlighting the broader modern civil war-like trends
taking place in their areas of influence which include Coahuila and
Tamaulipas and related to other cartel resource controlled areas (such
as in Michoacán), and identifying who the winners and losers will be
from this process. However, the work should not be viewed as providing
anything substantive relating to new security policy recommendations
meant to combat the Zetas or to counter the effects of the civil wars
(e.g. criminal insurgencies—ones that are economically rather than
politically driven) presently raging across many regions of Mexico.
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Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings
By Fernando Reinares
Reviewed by Audrey Kurth Cronin, Professor of International Security, School of
International Service, American University

A
Washington, DC and New
York: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press and Columbia
University Press, 2016
231 pages
$50.00

l-Qaeda’s Revenge is an excellent, well-sourced monograph analyzing
the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks on four commuter trains in
Madrid, Spain. The worst terrorist attack on European soil since the 1988
Pan Am 103 Lockerbie bombing, the so-called 3/11 attacks killed 191
people and injured at least 1,800 others. Victims were ordinary laborers,
university students, and office professionals, crammed into four packed
rush-hour trains headed into the city. This book sheds new light on who
perpetrated the attacks, how, why, and what it all means for anti-al-Qaeda
efforts. Based mainly on police records, criminal proceedings, and
information from the trials of the perpetrators, supplemented by
intelligence reports and personal interviews, it is a welcome contribution.
Beyond the tragedy of the victims’ fates, the attacks set off bitter
arguments about the West’s counterterrorism strategy against al-Qaeda.
Sadly, instead of uniting Spaniards in shared grief, the tragedy polarized
domestic politics. As the bombings happened three days before Spanish
national elections, sparring electoral parties blamed the actor that
benefited them politically. The ruling People’s Party, having bucked
domestic public opinion to side with the US and UK in the 2003
Iraq War, publicly tied the bombings (sans evidence) to the Basque
separatist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna. That was blatantly incorrect.
The Socialists, opponents of the 2003 war, blamed al-Qaeda for the
attacks. They were closer to the mark, and this book explains why.
Through a careful analysis of individuals, cells, and networks, Reinares
traces the origins to Pakistan (al-Qaeda) and Morocco (the Moroccan
Islamic Combatant Group). Al-Qaeda was clearly involved. The book’s
enthusiastic foreword from highly respected former Central Intelligence
Agency officer Bruce Reidel stresses this fact.
A second debate at the global level was about al-Qaeda’s strategy and
its effectiveness. In the aftermath of the bombings, the Spanish Socialists
won the election and pulled troops out of the coalition, an apparent
cause and effect serving bin Laden’s interests beautifully. Pundits waxed
sagaciously about the terrorist leader’s ability to coerce states to withdraw
from territorial commitments. Political scientists saw confirmation of
their bargaining theory models. Another contribution of this study is
its convincing case that these interpretations were wrong. According
to Reinares, with the operation underway years before elections were
called, the perpetrators couldn’t have known the date in advance (128).
Providing careful, detailed evidence, Reinares shows that the real
story predated the 2004 Spanish elections, the 2003 Iraq War, and even
the September 11, 2001 attacks. He demonstrates that violent jihadist
cells were established in Spain in 1994 (160). The specific decision to
carry out the Madrid bombings dated to a December 2001 meeting in
Karachi. It was then ratified at a February 2002 meeting of Maghreb
jihadist groups in Istanbul. The operational network that carried out
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the bombings coalesced before the Iraq War, between March 2002 and
summer 2003. So Western observers gave bin Laden too much credit
strategically and too little tactically: Reinares shows that this was not a titfor-tat operation orchestrated by al-Qaeda to sway the Spanish elections.
Third, the attack contributed to public bickering about the true
nature of the global al-Qaeda movement and the implications for the
US response. Some experts argued that the bombings were mainly
“inspired” rather than directed from al-Qaeda central. Others saw
central operational leadership calling the shots.
Hewing closely to his sources, Reinares shows that the Madrid
bombings had both top-down and bottom-up elements. He argues
that a critical clue for understanding al-Qaeda’s role was the weapons
employed. Detonating just before 8:00 a.m., 10 Goma-2 Eco dynamite
bombs were packed into backpacks and remotely triggered by Mitsubishi
Trium cell phones. These particular phones, also used in the 2002 Bali
attacks in Indonesia, were al-Qaeda’s “smoking guns” (so to speak),
because they were exactly the same phones used for explosions training
in an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan (145–46).
But local residents living and radicalized in Spain were also crucial
to the operation. The dynamite had been acquired on Spanish territory,
provided by a Spanish criminal gang (and its juvenile delinquent
stooges). This made the attack unlike the al-Qaeda-sponsored 2003
Casablanca attacks and the 2005 London bombings, which both
used TATP (triacetone triperoxide). “Previous kinship, friendship,
and neighborhood ties not only facilitated the processes of jihadist
radicalization, but also allowed the complete terrorist mobilization of
the 3/11 network,” Reinares writes (82).
Al-Qaeda’s Revenge conscientiously analyzes the detailed evidence
of a tragic incident that killed hundreds of Spaniards and altered the
trajectory of global counterterrorism. Those who counter al-Qaeda
should read it.
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Political History
Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow:
Confidential Diplomacy and Détente
By Richard A. Moss
Reviewed by William Thomas Allison, Professor of History, Georgia Southern
University

Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 2017
396 pages
$45.00

P

rimarily driven by increased access to various documents from
the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, scholarship on the most
controversial presidency in American history has reached new intensity,
insight, and understanding. An interesting array of scholars—from
renowned historians such as Stanley Kutler, Douglas Brinkley, Jeffrey
Kimball, and Ken Hughes, to more recent scholars such as Luke Nichter
and Richard Moss—have brought both seasoned analysis and fresh eyes
to this voluminous mountain of material. From this work, we know so
much more about the politics behind Nixon’s Vietnam policy, his covert
meddling in the Anna Chennault Affair, and the deeper revelation of the
complicated figure of Nixon himself. It is, as they say, the gift that keeps
on giving.
Welcome to this rich historiography the exciting work of the
aforementioned Richard Moss. An associate research professor in
the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the United States Naval War
College, Moss is one of the foremost students of the Nixon tapes. In
Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow, Moss convincingly shows the importance
of Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger’s use of
back channels, principally with Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Anatoly Fyodorovich Dobrynin, to Nixon’s Vietnam policy and relations
with the Soviet Union and China.
Like much secret diplomacy, Nixon’s use of back channels was
far from perfect but suited the needs of the moment. For a president
bordering on clinical paranoia, back channels naturally fit Nixon’s
complex personality and Kissinger’s sense of self-importance. Diaries,
memoirs, National Security Council minutes, and other materials
complement the tape transcripts Moss uses to illustrate several cases of
use of back channels by Kissinger and Nixon.
Moss examines back channel roles in defusing the Cienfuegos crisis,
shaping the American response to the India-Pakistan War of 1965—
early talks that became the Strategic Arms Limitation treaties—and,
of course, working the US-Soviet-China triangle, especially in relation
to Vietnam. All of these cases highlight the crucial importance of the
Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship. Dobrynin had used back channels
with the US government for years before establishing the unofficial line
with Kissinger.
For his part, Kissinger wanted a back channel with the Soviets
to manage personally discussions he believed too vital to be left to
officials he viewed as less-gifted—like Secretary of State William
Pierce Rogers. As Moss shows, Kissinger used the channel to slow or
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to accelerate negotiations, to clarify messaging, to suggest “linkage of
unrelated areas,” and as in the case of Vietnam, alert the Soviets to how
the US would respond to a crisis (303). Nixon’s response to the North
Vietnamese Easter Offensive would have assuredly shocked the Soviets
had Kissinger not prepared the ground through the back channel.
The back channel in this case allowed both parties to respond to the
invasion as their constituents would expect, providing cover enough to
save the Moscow Summit between President Nixon and Soviet General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972. Among the more interesting
areas Moss discusses is the White House’s special investigation unit—
the infamous “Plumbers”—originally formed out of genuine concern
for unauthorized leaks such as the famous Pentagon Papers. Of course,
what was originally convenient but turned more sinister over time,
leading to illegal acts that would bring down Nixon’s presidency. Moss
also briefly explores the curious Moorer-Radford Affair, in which the
military basically spied on the Nixon administration. Moss contends
that Kissinger’s surreptitious use of back channels bred a Nixon-like
distrust among the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward Kissinger and the
National Security Council (304). Nixon managed to keep the imbroglio
hidden to protect the back channel.
Moss shows the risks and rewards of using back channels in the
highest levels of international relations. The Kissinger-Dobrynin back
channel enabled détente to become a reality. But as productive as the
Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship was, it outlived its usefulness once
détente was achieved. As Nixon’s national security advisor, Kissinger
became a savant-like celebrity, and the ability to use back channels was
eroded. Once he became secretary of state, Kissinger had to revert to
what was in his eyes a bureaucracy-ridden system, the very same one he
had so often circumvented and subverted. By that time, however, the
back channel no longer served its former useful purpose.
With engaging narrative and impeccable research, Moss has
produced an important addition to Nixon historiography. Nixon’s Back
Channel to Moscow sheds further light on what once had been mysterious
and shrouded in shadows. It is an indispensable book for students of
the Nixon years and those interested in the cost-benefit of back channel
contacts. This book could not be more timely.

The Lincoln Assassination Riddle:
Revisiting the Crime of the Nineteenth Century
Edited By Frank J. Williams and Michael Burkhimer
Reviewed by Matthew Pinsker, Associate Professor of History and Pohanka
Chair in American Civil War History, Dickinson College

T

hree American presidents were murdered within the span of 36 years:
Abraham Lincoln (1865), James A. Garfield (1881), and William
McKinley (1901). During the same period, thousands of African
Americans—perhaps tens of thousands—were lynched for trying to
exercise their right to vote for such men. Yet, this explosion of political

Kent, OH: Kent State
University Press, 2016
214 pages
$29.95
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violence has been obscured in American memory because it occurred
after the Civil War, the nation’s bloodiest and most political conflict.
Of course, there is nothing obscure about Lincoln’s murder,
yet Frank Williams and Michael Burkhimer, the editors of this lively
collection of essays, are surely correct in describing it as The Lincoln
Assassination Riddle. The complexities behind actor John Wilkes Booth’s
conspiracy plot, the frantic investigation launched at Ford’s Theatre on
the night of the shooting, the subsequent military prosecution, and even
the lingering cultural memory of the tragic event all involve confounding
political riddles. There is a sense that solving these riddles can help
somehow explain the transition from Civil War to Reconstruction in a
fashion that puts the enduring political violence of nineteenth-century
American history into a more understandable context.
This book is part of the true crime history series from Kent
State University Press. Of all the contributions to this subject—with
representative titles in the series such as Ripperolog y (2006) and Hauptmann’s
Ladder (2014)—this particular volume covers the most significant
national event. For once, a true crime subtitle, Revisiting the Crime of the
Nineteenth Century, is not at all hyperbolic. Lincoln’s assassination was
arguably the central crime of American history.
What Williams and Burkhimer have done so admirably here is to
present the topic in a way that captures many of its key dimensions.
There is plenty of material on the political context of the attack, from
a sobering analysis of Booth’s extensive Confederate connections to a
learned discussion of how nineteenth-century laws of war applied to
the military trial of the conspirators. There is also a precise dissection
of Lincoln’s medical condition after the single bullet struck on Friday
night, April 14, 1865. In addition, various essayists offer insights into the
often-deceptive tactics of the professional actor turned political assassin,
and readers will find several useful and compact biographical profiles of
the other conspirators. Nonetheless, some of the most moving stories
concern the impact of the killing on the Lincoln family and others
whose lives were ripped apart by the assassination.
Nothing in this book will surprise hard-core Lincoln assassination
buffs, but more casual students will appreciate the latest range of insights
from leading minds on the subject presented in a series of short, easy-tofollow chapters. The roster of contributors is truly impressive including
notable experts Hugh Boyle, Burrus M. Carnahan, Joan L. Chaconas,
Richard W. Etulain, Michael S. Green, Blaine V. Houmes, Michael W.
Kauffman, Michael J. Kline, Steven G. Miller, Betty J. Ownsbey, Edward
Steers Jr., Thomas R. Turner, Laurie Verge, and Steven J. Wright.
Still, there have been two important recent books on the Lincoln
assassination by authors who are not represented. Insights from Terry
Alford’s excellent biography, Fortune’s Fool: The Life of John Wilkes Booth
(2015), and Martha Hodes’s wide-ranging study on the cultural aftermath
of the killing, Mourning Lincoln (2015), might have added further depth
to this collection. Yet, what Williams and Burkhimer have achieved
with The Lincoln Assassination Riddle is to provide a compact and effective
gateway for readers who want to catch up on the range of questions
historians have been chasing and trying to answer recently about the
most significant political murder in American history.
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The Netanyahu Years
By Ben Caspit
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus , US Army War College

I

sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu is currently struggling
to address several scandals of various seriousness, including one which
led to the arrest of his former chief of staff on corruption charges. These
problems could potentially emerge as a threat to Netanyahu remaining in
office, but his personality is always to fight to the last and never give up.
Even if the attorney general indicts him, Israeli law does not require him
to resign unless he is convicted of a criminal offense. Moreover, no matter
how serious his problems become, Bibi has consistently proven himself
to be not only a survivor, but also Israel’s most brilliant contemporary
politician. Understanding Netanyahu’s politics and policies is therefore
vital to understanding Israel, and providing such knowledge is the purpose
of Israeli journalist Ben Caspit’s excellent but often unsympathetic new
volume on the prime minister.
Netanyahu grew up in a politically conservative family moving
between Israel and the United States. Bibi’s father, a dedicated scholar of
Jewish history, accepted a position in the United States due his difficulty
finding a position in Israel’s mostly liberal academia. Consequently,
much of Bibi’s early education occurred in the Philadelphia suburbs,
where, he learned to speak perfect English. After graduating from
high school, Netanyahu returned to Israel and joined the elite Sayeret
Matkal commandos and participated in a variety of dangerous combat
operations. Later, he moved back to the United States and graduated
with honors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
After various forays into business in the United States, Netanyahu
became a public affairs attaché and spokesman for the Israeli embassy
in Washington. Bibi performed superbly in this position due to his
media friendly personality, and he was later promoted to become Israel’s
ambassador to the United Nations. In New York, he again served as an
outstanding Israeli spokesman and perhaps more importantly became
a fundraising genius, able to charm a wide network of friendly Jewish
millionaires and billionaires interested in contributing to projects
in Israel.
After service at the United Nations, Netanyahu returned to Israel
becoming a Likud party leader, where his American-style media and
political talents, “were light years ahead of those of his rivals” (130).
After serving in a variety of important posts including deputy foreign
minister, Bibi was elected prime minister in 1996. Unfortunately for
Netanyahu’s ambitions, he was much better at campaigning than
governing, and his tenure lasted only until 1999 when Labor leader
Ehud Barak defeated him by a large margin. In the aftermath of the
defeat, Ariel Sharon replaced Bibi as head of the Likud. Netanyahu
briefly became Sharon’s foreign minister and then finance minister
after Likud won the January 2003 election. He eventually led Likud in
opposition when Sharon left to form his own very successful political
party, Kadima.

New York: Thomas Dunne
Books, 2017
506 pages
$29.99
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Netanyahu again became Prime Minister following the 2009
election. According to Caspit, he entered office with three main political
goals beyond strengthening his hold on power. These were to end the
Iranian nuclear program, to undermine and destroy the peace process
with the Palestinians without being blamed for doing so, and “to survive
unharmed the Obama administration, doing his utmost to ensure that
it lasted only one term” (245). Caspit suggests that the last goal was
particularly important to Netanyahu since he viewed Obama’s chief goal
for the Middle East as “to make peace with the Muslim world” (256).
He believed Obama had no real affinity for Israel or any serious record
of working with pro-Israeli interest groups.
When Obama gave a conciliatory speech in Cairo about US relations
with the Islamic world, Caspit describes Netanyahu as watching it with
burning anger. Obama also pressured the Israelis to stop building and
expanding settlements in the West Bank and thereby empower the
peace process. Eventually, Obama and Netanyahu descended into an
overwhelming level of distrust that would become “endless mutual
loathing” (315). To make matters worse for Netanyahu, Obama had come
to power with around 70 percent of the Jewish vote and surrounded
himself with liberal Jewish aides whom some of Netanyahu associates
described with the slur “self-hating” (281). The crisis became acute in
early 2015 when Netanyahu delivered a speech to Congress opposing the
Iranian nuclear agreement that Obama claimed as a major achievement
of his administration. The speech did nothing to derail the agreement,
but instead threatened to harm traditional bipartisan support for Israel.
Some Democrats may have even started to view Netanyahu as a new Dick
Cheney, someone they would never trust on matters of war and peace.
According to Caspit, Netanyahu turned Iran into an obsession
and became thoroughly convinced Iran was an irrational, messianic,
and suicidal state that would allow itself to be destroyed by US and
Israeli retaliatory strikes in order to annihilate Israel. This viewpoint
was not shared by either the Israeli security community or the Obama
administration. Caspit maintains that Netanyahu is so certain on this
issue that he will not consider divergent views and even regards himself
as a modern-day Winston Churchill, opposing Iran when others sought
to appease it. Moreover, Caspit also argues Netanyahu, believes he
alone has “the historical, intellectual, and mental attributes to bring
together all the sane forces in the world to stop the second Holocaust”
(178). Netanyahu’s credibility in making such a grandiose claim may
nevertheless be partially undercut by his September 2002 testimony
before the US Congress in strong support of an invasion of Iraq, to
which he saw almost no down side.
In sum, this work is an important, interesting and comprehensive
biography but it is also a harsh critique of important Israeli and US
policymakers and most especially Netanyahu. Obama, Trump, Sara
Netanyahu, and a variety of other US and Israeli politicians are also
taken to task on some occasions, but never as harshly as Bibi. Whether
or not Netanyahu’s flaws are as profound as Caspit maintains will be for
the reader to consider.
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Military History
War in the Shallows
By John Carrell Sherwood
Reviewed by Martin N. Murphy, Visiting Fellow, Corbett Centre for Maritime
Security Studies

W

ar in the Shallows represents, in the author’s own words, “the first
comprehensive scholarly attempt to piece together the operational
history of the US Navy in South Vietnam” during the so-called American
phase between 1965 and 1968. This subject has been covered already
by several authors, the best known of which is probably Thomas J.
Cutler who served as a naval advisor in Vietnam during 1972 prior to
his appointment to the Naval Academy. His history—Brown Water, Black
Berets published in 1988—drew on his personal experience supplemented
by extensive interviews with others who had served in theater.
The current work is published by the Naval History and Heritage
Command. Its predecessor organizations, the Naval History Division
and the Naval Historical Center, published two official histories in
1976 and 1986 written, in part, by Edward J. Marolda, Dr. Sherwood’s
predecessor as senior historian.
All this Dr. Sherwood makes clear in his preface and
acknowledgements. What he has been able to do, however, is to take
advantage of material recently released from the Command’s archives—
Vietnamese documents and interviews conducted personally with
former Viet Cong. He makes no claim to have unearthed new evidence
sufficient to force a change in the accepted assessment of how the river
and coastal wars were executed nor of the experiences of those who
conducted them. This is in no way a revisionist account. Moreover, while
it draws general conclusions about the Vietnam riverine conflict, the
book stops well before the US withdrawal from South Vietnam and
therefore does not touch upon the significant SEALORDS campaign or
the hand-over to the Vietnamese. The author admits that together these
topics are too large in scope to cover in the current volume and deserve
separate book-length treatments.
The approach adopted is to integrate illustrative vignettes of crucial
actions into a larger operational history; eschewing, in other words, the
often-unsatisfactory editorial practice of isolating “action sequences”
into sidebars. Space has also been found to address the humble but
essential issues of selection, training, base operations, intelligence and
engagement rules that made the US role successful; belatedly so, it must
be admitted, in the light of the perspicacity of the 1965 Bucklew Report
and the slow implementation of the measures it recommended (27–28).
The book makes no attempt to disguise the shortcomings of South
Vietnam’s own forces and the roots of their problems in national (and
inevitably service) politics and corruption. Sherwood rightly highlights
how these shortcomings often placed US advisors in positions of great

Washington, DC: Naval
History and Heritage
Command, 2015
425 pages
Free Online

124

Parameters 47(3) Autumn 2017

peril and how bravery and dedication of outstanding individuals won the
respect of the frontline fighters they were trying to help.
It should therefore be regarded not perhaps as a standard history but
as an examination and eventual confirmation of the existing evidence.
The author does not make clear when he found deviations from the
existing record. It is therefore fair to assume if any were uncovered they
were not egregious.
One opportunity that has been missed is to place US riverine
operations in two contexts: in the thinking of Westmoreland and
subsequently Abrams and their staffs and against the background of
lessons learned (or ignored) from French riverine operations during
the preceding Indochina War. The author touches upon the latter but
only briefly.
Even though French riverine operations took place largely in the
Red River delta in the north, where the geographical and meteorlogical
conditions were quite different, the enemy’s tactics were similar to those
employed subsequently in the south. For example, it was the French who
stood up the precursor to the Mobile Riverine Force, the dinassauts
(short for division d’infanterie naval d’assaut), a concept Bernard
Fall complimented back-handedly as “one of the few worthwhile
contributions of the Indochina War to military knowledge”(6). However,
any dismissal of the dinassauts’ achievements (like everything else in the
French commitment) cannot ignore they were severely underresourced
due to France’s straightened circumstances post-World War II, one thing
America’s intervention unquestionably did not lack.
What the author does confirm, however, is two things: first, after
decades of what Naval War College professor John Hattendorf described
as a focus on the “care and feeding of machines,” officers and bluejackets
alike renewed the acquaintanceship with close quarter battle that had
been such a large part of the naval service of their predecessors in the
nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. It was not until after World
War I that landings and land service had become the preserve of the
Marine Corps. The Navy, individually and collectively, adapted to the
unexpected demands of this vicious war with courage, imagination, and
skill. Second, however brutal and unpredictable the fighting was on the
rivers, in the swamps, and around the coasts of Vietnam, coastal and
riverine operations retained their essentially naval character.
Wars are often dominated by logistics, and Vietnam was no
exception. Naval warfare is predominantly about securing safe access
to resources and communications while denying the same to the enemy.
The Viet Cong depended on water transport. “Market Time,” the
coastal interdiction operation, virtually closed this route, increasing the
Communists’ dependence on the Ho Chi Minh trail. The great battle of
the rivers was also an interdiction battle. How successful the Navy and its
Vietnamese allies were in cutting the movement of material and cadres
is hard to quantify, but without doubt, they introduced inefficiencies
into the Viet Cong supply chain, which hampered and disrupted their
operations. If US policymakers had agreed to use such measures to inject
similarly persistent inefficiencies into the Viet Cong’s overland routes, it
is conceivable the war’s outcome may have been different.
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Doing What You Know: The United States and
250 Years of Irregular War
By David E. Johnson
Reviewed by J.P. Clark, Army Strategist and author of Preparing for War: the
Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815-1917

T

he United States military has conducted irregular warfare since its
inception. Yet, there is no consensus as to whether this legacy is
one of triumph or failure. Those with a positive view generally look to
either the earliest days when the influence of the country’s first way of
war was strong or to the present narrative of a combination of brainy
soldiers and fearless special operations forces defeating insurgents and
terrorists. Critics focus more on the intervening period, portraying a
hidebound officer corps unwilling or unable to adapt to unconventional
foes from Native American warriors to Viet Cong guerillas. In this
brief monograph published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, David E. Johnson (who has since returned to the RAND
Corporation) argues the United States has never been so good nor so bad
in practicing irregular warfare as either caricature suggests, but instead
has a long tradition of mixed results.
Doing What You Know consists of three parts. The first examines
irregular warfare from the American Revolution through the Vietnam
War; for their length, the overviews of operations in the Philippines
(1899–1913) and Vietnam are particularly good. This, however, is a
work of policy advocacy rather than history, and so those seeking a
comprehensive account will be disappointed. There is no mention of
irregular warfare in the Mexican-American War, and little on antebellum
frontier campaigns or irregular warfare in the Civil War. Also, there
is no discussion of independent Marine Corps operations; the “United
States Army and 250 Years of Irregular Warfare” would be a more
accurate subtitle.
Yet it is likely that even a fuller historical account would only
reinforce Johnson’s theme of continuity. The late nineteenth-century
frontier army is often caricatured as too inflexible and hidebound, while
the Philippine-American War is regarded as a great success. But Johnson
notes many officers served in both places and that contemporaries
felt they were applying hard-won knowledge from their frontier
experience to colonial counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, one thread
of this continuity was a hard-hand mentality expressed in method (e.g.
“water cure” interrogations) and in operational approaches, notably
the use of “re-concentration” camps and scorched-earth destruction in
Batangas Province.
In the second section, which examines “21st Century U.S. COIN,”
Johnson notes a break with the more ruthless past; one of the defining
characteristics of recent campaigns has been increased “constraints
on what are acceptable methods in COIN” (71). Although Johnson
attributes this shift to factors outside military control—the 24/7
media cycle and a change in societal values—his narrative suggests
the military on the whole willingly accepted the more restrained,
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population-centric counterinsurgency approach as expressed in the
2006 edition of Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Johnson does
not claim the military has completely abandoned violence; he notes, for
instance, similarities between kill and capture efforts like the Vietnamera Phoenix Program and the US Joint Special Operations Command
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Doing What You Know notes the
balance between carrot and stick has tilted dramatically toward the
former in comparison to previous eras.
In the final section, Johnson offers two overarching conclusions.
The first is that failing to plan for transitions after a major conflict
can lead to insurgency. To avoid large-scale irregular warfare, the
Army should be ready to fill the postconflict security and governance
vacuum. In this regard, Johnson approves of current thinking, citing the
discussion of consolidating gains within the Army Operating Concept
as a promising start.
In contrast, Johnson’s second conclusion—“large-scale irregular
warfare and COIN are a brutal business that requires coercion”—goes
against the present organizational grain, which is still shaped by FM
3-24 (82). Johnson advocates a greater willingness to “ruthlessly and
violently” pursue and separate the enemy from indigenous support as
was the case in earlier successful irregular warfare (85). Unfortunately,
the history presented in the first section is too cursory to demonstrate
conclusively that earlier hard-hand approaches were necessary for
victory. Indeed, the overall record of mixed results suggests complex
causal relationships.
Nonetheless, there is a reasonable case for the necessity of coercion.
Irregular warfare often occurs within a strategic context in which meeting
national policy objectives requires some reordering of deeply ingrained
political, social, or economic patterns in a foreign land. Such changes
are bound to be resisted by a wide range of actors, from those with a
significant vested interest to those who simply resent external influence.
The more significant the change—and changes of strategic importance
are likely significant—the less benevolence, cultural understanding, and
force of argument are likely to be sufficient.
Yet Doing What You Know stops short of advocating any particular
coercive measure. Indeed, Johnson notes even the uncomfortably coercive
edge of seemingly benign projects such as education; a superintendent of
the Carlisle Indian School saw education as a means “to kill the Indian
in him” (15). Elsewhere, Johnson ominously notes the brutal Sri Lankan
campaign against the Tamil Tigers is one of the few examples of a recent
counterinsurgency. Perhaps the worst outcome is that Johnson is correct
in three of his assertions: the United States will again engage in irregular
warfare, irregular warfare requires some degree of “ruthless and brutal”
measures, and structural factors within the US and the military have
caused a turn away from such measures. If so, then the problem is deeper
than military tactics and doctrine and so foretells something even worse
than the mixed results of the past.
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War Neurology
Edited by Laurent Tatu and Julien Bogousslavsky
Reviewed by Andreas Kuersten, US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

T

he editors of War Neurology, Laurent Tatu and Julien Bogousslavsky,
lament the fact that “war and neurology are two themes that are
rarely linked, and war neurology is not a subject in its own right” (vii).
While this statement must be caveated since the neurological effects of
war on humans and the history of such ailments and their treatment
have not escaped consistent attention, the editors are correct that the
unification of war and neurology under a single subfield of study
has thus far not occurred. As such, “this book intends to lay the
foundation” for such a subfield (vii). Commensurate with this goal, Tatu
and Bogousslavsky have put together an expansive volume delving into
the history and practice of war neurology from antiquity to today.
The book begins with a general overview of the historical
development of neurological practice during wartime. The ancient
Egyptians were the first to record connections between battle wounds
and neurological deficits approximately 5,000 years ago. “It was
recognized early that head wounds were especially dangerous,” and in
the close-quarter, direct combat of antiquity, “warriors tended to focus
on striking their enemies’ heads in order to defeat them” (3, 1). Beyond
the head, spinal cord and peripheral nerve damage suffered during
combat were also given special attention. As far as mental disorders
arising from battle experiences, mentions of “mental stress produced by
warfare” are found in ancient literary works, but not more widely (7).
Building on this foundation, War Neurolog y covers advancements
in neurological science from the Napoleonic Wars to the campaign in
Afghanistan. There is also a chapter on the modern history of neurotoxic
weapons, including details on their individual characteristics.
Broadly, War Neurolog y is an illustration of the intimate link between
warfare and progress in medical science and practice. It has been noted
that “it is paradoxical that through war, a concerted effort to annihilate
man, we have learned more and better ways to preserve him” (62). But
such a relationship is in fact logical. This is because the devastation of
human bodies wrought by war provides “the opportunity of making
uncomplicated clinical observations,” which “is rare in civil life” (43).
Accordingly, “throughout human history, war and the subsequent need
for treatment of war wounds has provided a fecund environment for the
development of medicine as a whole. The origin of surgery is particularly
rooted in the treatment of injured participants of war and combat,” and
the subfield of neurosurgery emerged and rapidly developed as a result
of twentieth-century wars (22).
Further cementing the link between war and medical advancement
is the fact that personnel are arguably the most important weapons
in the arsenal of a military force, and this makes their treatment a
critical component of warfighting. Avenues of warrior degradation must
be countered in order to maintain military strength and capability most
effectively. Neurological impairments are some of the most pernicious
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harms suffered by fighting men and women. Sides that are better able
to treat and recycle injured personnel gain a meaningful advantage
over opponents. As such, “while war influenced the development of
medicine, and neurology in particular, medicine also helped to shape the
outcomes of wars” (93).
War Neurolog y provides two excellent examples of this phenomenon.
The first is the American Civil War. On top of advantages in funding,
equipment, and manpower, Union forces also employed a superior
military medical complex to that fielded by the Confederacy. This meant
that “a greater proportion of the Union army was healthy than of the
opposing Confederate force,” and “it can be argued that the advantages
provided by medical science were a significant factor in determining
the eventual victory of the Union” (105). The second example is the
German military, the Wehrmacht, in World War II. Its remarkable
success at the beginning of the conflict was due in part to highly
mobile forward-operating medical units and streamlined methods
for moving and treating wounded, including specialized neurological
units and procedures. These facilitated the Wehrmacht’s quick strike
blitzkrieg method of attack and “became viewed as ‘indispensable’ for
the war effort” (126).
War and neurology are also connected through the use of neurological
knowledge to devise weapons, enhance soldiers, and gain intelligence.
War Neurolog y addresses the first of these areas in a chapter on
neurotoxic substances and their effects. The book, however, provides
no coverage of the latter two—like the contributions of neurology
to research techniques, substances, and devices intended to heighten
soldier cognition or induce captives to speak to interrogators—nor the
ethical implications of these pursuits. A chapter considering these topics
would have been a welcome addition.
That shortcoming notwithstanding, War Neurolog y offers an
engaging, far-reaching examination that successfully lays a foundation
for war neurology as a distinct subfield of study. While time will tell if
this foundation is built upon, the volume is valuable in its own right
and will find an appreciative audience in readers interested in military
medicine specifically or seeking to add depth to their understanding of
the many facets of war.

How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization
in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950
By Seth Johnston
Reviewed by Joel R. Hillison, Professor of National Security Studies, US Army
War College
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A

fter NATO added its twenty-ninth member state, Montenegro,
in July 2017, institutions in Europe remain under significant
strain with challenges such as economic weakness in the eurozone,
renewed assertiveness from Russia, persistent terrorist attacks, and
a wave of “eurosceptism” emboldened by the Brexit. Any of these
challenges conceivably could threaten the existence of NATO and the
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European Union. To survive, these organizations will need to adapt.
How NATO Adapts provides useful insights for shaping that adaptation.
While organizational adaptation is not always an interesting topic, Seth
Johnston does a masterful job of providing pertinent details while
avoiding the minutia. His compelling historical analysis illustrates the
institution’s adaptations—in terms of mission, organization, size, and
strategy—arising from changes in the European and global security
environment. Under this approach, institutions such as NATO, are often
path dependent, meaning history has significant and lasting impacts on
an organization’s trajectory. This book selects cases and identifies critical
junctures where changes in the external strategic environment disrupted
current institutional paths and presented alternatives to the alliance.
Johnston argues in each of these instances that NATO successfully
adapted its organization and strategic approach.
The first section of the book, which contains a literature review,
will interest international-relations scholars. Policy oriented readers,
however, may get hung up in the theoretical discussions. The case
studies that follow will interest policymakers and senior members of the
defense community.
The chapter on early adaptation is the most enlightening. During
this period, the institution was still new and faced existential threats.
Discussing the critical juncture of the Korean War, Johnston explains
the history of the alliance, its gradual turn to nuclear deterrence, the
rearmament of Germany as a member of NATO, and the alternative,
but ultimately unsuccessful path, of establishing a European common
army: the European Defense Community. The army was an attempt by
European states to create their own collective security capability at a time
when the United States was distracted by a more global confrontation
with the Soviet Union. Although defeated by France—the very country
that had proposed its creation—the case study in the European Defense
Community provides a useful guide for how the contemporary EU
Common Security and Defense Policy might be adapted. The original
intent for the Community nested it within the alliance framework,
which allowed France and its European allies to influence German
rearmament more closely while simultaneously extending the nuclear
umbrella to Germany, which had no independent defense capability
at the time. While this effort failed, it demonstrated the possibility of
greater European military autonomy from the United States and NATO.
Brexit has already reignited talks of a European army. These efforts
might not only encourage greater EU burden-sharing for security but
also encourage closer ties with non-NATO countries.
The case study of the French withdrawal from the Integrated
Control and Command Structure is also insightful. France was leery of
further subordination to US dominance and resented increased nuclear
cooperation between Britain and the United States. France’s departure
enabled the elimination of some outdated organizations within NATO
and a more rational command structure created from the military
headquarters in Mons, Belgium, the military committee, the Defense
Planning Group, and the Nuclear Planning Group—a new NATO
Headquarters with all international staff in Brussels. During the French
crisis, NATO remained neutral and avoided exacerbating tensions
between the United States and France. As a result, France remained
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in the alliance, but outside of the military structure allowing needed
organizational reforms and strategic adaptations such as the creation of
a “two-tiered political structure” and the strategic concept of Flexible
Response, to proceed (115). This institutional approach might be useful
in dealing with contemporary issues such as an illiberal Turkey. As with
France in the 1960s, NATO has the ability to adapt to these challenges
without rupturing the alliance.
The later chapters look at the immediate post-Cold War and postKosovo adaptations of the alliance. These chapters are also relevant
and equally persuasive. While not the primary tool of choice for the
United States initially, NATO actively sought a role in Afghanistan and
provided needed support to a stretched US military during the surge in
Iraq in 2007 and subsequent surge in Afghanistan in 2010. Despite its
flaws and limitations, NATO adapted and contributed substantially to
these operations.
Overall, Johnston makes a persuasive argument and adds to the
literature on path dependence and critical junctures. More important,
How NATO Adapts provides historical context needed as the United
States recommits to deterring Russian aggression and continues to play
a role in European security and stability.
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Regional Studies
Security Forces in African States: Cases and Assessment
By Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb
Reviewed by Diane E. Chido, author of Chaos to Cohesion: A Regional Approach
to Security, Stability, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

E

ditors Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb have presented an
interesting assessment tool in their Security Forces in African States:
Cases and Assessment. The tool is intended to evaluate “how well security
institutions are designed, governed and operated with the institutional
mix” (2). The authors note armed forces can be a valuable partner in
stabilization, especially in a developing country or one recovering
from war, fragility, or natural disaster, but this is not their primary role.
Shemella and Tomb focus comprehensively on the security sector from
the perspective of effective governance and civil-military relations for
attaining “traditional” national and more importantly, human security.
The authors intentionally created an assessment tool that can be
presented and used quickly, acknowledging there are other more
complex tools to apply and implement. The process is for “government
officials, working with key personnel in each security institution (and
perhaps international technical partners)” to “generate tables for each
. . . security institution” to include armed forces, law enforcement,
intelligence services and institutions as necessary. (19–20)
Recommending two levels of assessment to identify qualitatively
how a nation distributes resources and roles and provides civilian
institutional control over its security sector, Shemella and Tomb identify
areas for Level 1 assessment as national branding, national security
threat identification, institutional roles vis-à-vis the armed forces and
the police, and the strength of the political system prevailing in the state.
The conceptual model of “national branding” is particularly useful
and could be deconstructed as an entire chapter or book on its own. The
idea of branding typically involves an intentional campaign to present a
product or service to a selected audience. In this case, the authors suggest
the audience is other governments, who will consider these “brands” as
a shorthand to determine their own bilateral and regional strategies and
alliances, whether this brand has been developed “deliberately or not.”
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Shemella and Tomb’s Representation of National Branding
1. Warfighter

Initiate conflict with other states.
Prevail militarily.

2. Defender

Repel invasion and obtain assistance from other
countries. Defend against transnational threats.

3. Peacekeeper

Organize, train, and deploy armed
forces specifically for international
peacekeeping missions.

4. Fireman

Use armed forces to perform any domestic
mission that other government institutions
cannot be trusted to accomplish.

5. Policeman

Use armed forces to enforce laws. Police
in support.

6. Troublemaker

Allow armed forces to determine when to use
coercive force against other states.

Their Level 2 assessment rates governance and capacity of the armed
forces, law enforcement, intelligence, and civilian institutions responsible
for overseeing them on a Likert Scale of 1–10 according to a set of
desired outcomes for each based on a Western view of effective civilmilitary relations. They then apply the framework to 10 African nations
with a full assessment presented on Mali.
There are a number of obvious challenges associated with qualitative
assessment in any context. As the tool is intended to affect policy
formulation and implementation, and the method for populating the
matrices is based on input from officials inside and outside the target
government, participants must be carefully selected and encouraged to
provide bias-free inputs as far as possible to safeguard the integrity of
the process. This could perhaps be accomplished under an independent
inspector general construct to avoid parochial responses.
The authors recommend open discussion among the chosen panel of
experts but a better model might be the Delphi Method, in which experts
are assigned to respond to a set of questions during the intelligence
analysis process. This method is typically repeated in a preset number
of rounds with the panelists made aware of each anonymized member’s
prior round responses and supporting arguments. It is assumed that
the panelists will be informed by their peers’ arguments and coalesce
around a very few common responses. These converge into a singular
assessment by a moderator selected to lead the process to ensure there is
an efficient and valuable final result.
Any such collaborative process has proven merit in combining
expert judgments but can have dubious value when such a group is called
to assess its own organization and can result in a collection of individual
resource- or prestige-based interests at the expense of the collective
good. The additional danger with any such converging method requiring
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a single final “answer” is degeneration of the process into groupthink,
which pares the final result into a “lowest common denominator”
response that is often too broad or too simplistic to be of value. The
authors do not discuss the process of bias reduction, particularly when
assessing nations with histories of corruption and cronyism.
One additional concern for the assessment process is that the Level
2 matrices for armed forces, law enforcement, and intelligence each
include a final “outcome” described as the “culmination of efforts listed
above.” Once all the outcomes are averaged to determine the Likert
score for each, inclusion of this element seems to skew the results, as this
item adds an aggregation of those preceding it, potentially reducing the
reliability of the score itself.
Shemella and Tomb have applied the tool to ten cases in Africa with
a complete set of Level 1 and 2 matrices for Mali. This case indicates that
since the 2012 coup and ongoing insurgency, Malian security forces have
accepted civilian control and do not pose a threat to the government;
however, Mali must develop a formal national security policy with
enhanced oversight and appropriate administration, training, and
resource allocation to this sector to achieve sustainable national and
human security.1

Thabo Mbeki and Julius Nyerere
By Adekeye Adebajo and by Paul Bjerk
Reviewed by Diane E. Chido, author of Chaos to Cohesion: A Regional Approach
to Security, Stability, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

T

he Ohio University series of Short Histories of Africa promises to
offer “lively biographies” as concise introductory guides to general
African topics. In the case of both volumes reviewed, the series delivers.
Adekeye Adebajo fleetingly compares former South African
President Thabo Mbeki’s life and legacy with that of former Ghanaian
President Kwame Nkrumah, noting the outsized role each played in their
country’s move toward postcolonial independence and development but
each failed “to deliver the economic kingdom in the end [which] led
to the political crucifixion of both prophets” (164). Tanzania’s Julius
Nyerere can also be counted among such prophets, as his nation’s
independence held such promise but his economic policies had similarly
disastrous outcomes.
It is clear that Adebajo admires Mbeki and wishes his story was one
of complete success, frequently describing him as “the most important
political figure of his generation” both in South Africa and across the
continent. Adebajo emphasizes Mbeki’s personal integrity and “total”
commitment to end Apartheid through an entire life of service to that
cause, but admits that Mbeki’s contentious yet technocratic manner, as
1      As the publisher of the volume is the US Naval Post-graduate School, the authors note on
page 14 that this institution began educating Malian officers in 2016, while the Army War College
began accepting Malian students in its Master’s program in 1998 and has since hosted seven.
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well as decades spent in exile and his Western-influenced intellectual
perspectives and polish, alienated him from his own people.
Mbeki tried to enhance independent Africa’s self-image through
an African Renaissance that would unite South Africa and the entire
continent, making him a more effective continental leader than a
national one. His legacy is likely to be marked more by his Pan-African
achievements in developing regional communities, particularly the
Southern African Development Community, the Organization of
African States and its successor, the African Union.
Paul Bjerk stresses that Nyerere’s commitment was to a nonviolent,
inclusive transition to independence, which resulted in a statist economy
engendering widespread corruption. Bjerk describes Nyerere’s talent for
appealing to his mainly rural constituency in a multinational country
with earthy, universal themes.
Nyerere expanded the concept of “family unity” or Ujamaa to
indicate a Tanzanian and more broadly African identity embracing a
unified diversity with a socialist but classless core, which included use of
Swahili as a national indigenous, noncolonial language. This philosophy
also enabled Nyerere to enact autocratic policies through one-party rule
without fear of dissent and evading Cold War power plays in the context
of a national ethic preserving its interests. The approach also managed
to unite not only those in the territory of Tanganiyka, but to incorporate
the islands of Zanzibar into the United Republic of Tanzania.
Bjerk’s characterization of Nyerere is a leader wholly devoted to
his people, no matter how unfortunate the outcomes of many policies,
while Mbeki appears devoted to the cause of independence and policy
formulation for its own sake. Nyerere ironically claimed shortly before
independence in 1960: “When hunting there is no problem. . . . Problems
start when the animal has died, that’s when the fighting starts” (53).
His claim anticipated that various factions tearing apart the colonial
corpse could destroy the chance for a unified independent country. The
claim also underscores an intrinsic understanding of the thorny issues of
governance with which Adebajo does not imbue Mbeki.
Mbeki is often criticized for maintaining an economic system that
continued to benefit white South Africans and empowering an elite,
educated black class, while Nyerere’s 1967 Arusha Declaration raised
alarm bells about an urban elite gradually overtaking the Tanzanian
government while the rural majority remained exploited and oppressed,
without an internal socialist revolution. As a result, such elites continue
to control the majority of South Africa’s wealth and the rural poor of
Tanzania have remained so.
Nyerere’s devotion to Maoism led to his disastrous “villagization”
program, which forced people to relocate to new farmland in “modern”
villages. The country’s inability to develop a robust industrial base
left Tanzania increasingly reliant on tea and tobacco production to
the detriment of locally-grown food, which had sustained traditional
villages. This resulted in famines, squandering of foreign exchange on
food imports, and an impressive array of illicit trade.
On social issues, Nyerere did expand the reach of health care and
education in Tanzania, with nearly the entire adult population literate
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by 1980. Mbeki’s “policy of denial” in the face of Africa’s AIDS crisis is
often considered his greatest failure with some critics claiming hundreds
of thousands of lives could have been saved had he supported robust
programs to make antiretroviral medications accessible.
One of the most interesting messages in both books is the widely
held belief that no country could be truly free until all of Africa was free,
which motivated African leaders and organizations across the continent
to work toward independence, especially after the British relinquished
control over India in 1947. These early activities have defined bilateral,
regional and continental alliances and enmities to the present day.
In a message for us across time and space, after Tanzania’s successful
invasion of aggressor Uganda, Nyerere stated of the resulting occupation,
“We don’t want to get too involved in Uganda because we know they’ll
end up resenting us. It’s an irony that no matter how careful we are, at
the end of the day, they’ll resent our help” (115).
The historical context presented through the lens of key actors
provides the broad and human perspective without which African
politics cannot be fully understood, especially to Ohio University’s
intended audience newly discovering this complex continent.
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he study of leadership has become an industry, and researchers
and authors have partitioned this broad subject area into several
categories such as political, business, and corporate leadership; civic
leadership; and military leadership. While some researchers may argue
that each type of leadership is unique, it may be that all are cut from the
same cloth. Examining parts may provide a better understanding of the
whole of collective human interactions to achieve common goals.
The editors of Negative Leadership: International Perspectives, Lieutenant
Colonel Daniel Watola, an associate professor at the US Air Force Academy,
and Commander Dave Woycheshin, of the Personnel Selections Branch
of the Canadian Armed Forces, have gathered papers from a diverse
group of military scholars and practitioners working at professional
military education and defense research organizations in multiple
nations. These researchers are participants in the annual International
Military Leadership Association Workshop (IMLAW) which, since
2006, has resulted in the publication of an edited volume. Woyschesin
has served as coeditor for three previous volumes. For 2016, the theme is
negative leadership—a timely topic given recent interest and scholarship
on toxic leadership. (See a review of “Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the
US Military” in the Winter 2015–16 issue of Parameters).
Comprised of 15 chapters, the book provides international
perspectives on the phenomenon of leadership, specifically in the
military context. While it is encouraging so much energy is devoted
to the subject, it may be disheartening to acknowledge that military
leadership, as leadership in the civilian domain, has many facets and
presents itself along a continuum of good to bad, including military
leaders who range from competent to incompetent and dysfunctional.
Leadership may be defined generally as a process to influence others to
accomplish tasks or goals. How this process is applied by individuals
can have a “dark side” and, hence, a negative impact on followers and
organizations. Indeed, each chapter attempts to define the nature of
leadership and categorize its manifestations. In doing so, there is overlap
among some chapters in the literature reviews of leadership theories,
models, and competencies. The commonalities, however, allow for the
designation of a cluster of individual and organizational behaviors under
the umbrella of negative leadership.
The opening chapters, “Toxic Leadership” and “Why Negative
Leadership Matters” provide the foundation and military context, albeit
from a predominately US perspective, for the remaining contributions.
The authors cite seminal and emerging research (that have added
adjectives such as abusive, destructive, tyrannical, despotic, unethical,
and laissez-faire to the lexicon of leadership) and contend that militaries
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are uniquely vulnerable to negative leadership, which emanates from
the “toxic triangle” of destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and
conducive environments. As Stanford University professor Philip
Zimbardo explores in The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People
Turn Evil (Random House, 2007), readers will ponder whether negative
leadership is an either-or proposition of “bad apples” or “bad barrels.”
Subsequent chapters provide case studies and anecdotes of negative
leadership that exist within principally democratic national militaries.
Chapter 4, “Negative Organizations: Antecedents of Negative
Leadership,” posits that attributes generally associated with individuals
can be extended and applied as organization-level attitudes and behaviors.
Resource scarcity and lack of staff training can result in organizational
anorexia. Likewise, organizational greediness can “exact high demands
[of] employees” for loyalty, time, and energy (61). Organizational
narcissism demonstrated in self-aggrandizement, sense of entitlement,
and rationalization can result in failure to meet the needs of stakeholders
(59). Such organizational pressures would create an environment (i.e.,
bad barrel) conducive to generating negative attitudes and behaviors of
leaders as well as followers.
Accordingly, Chapters 5, 6, and 9 (written by authors from Sweden,
Canada, and New Zealand) explore what makes leaders—innate
personality, learned behaviors, or organizational context—bad apples.
Chapter 10 from South Africa examines military leader failures caused
by incompetence or lack of character, cognitive abilities, professional
knowledge and skills, and the ability to influence others. The combination
of bad apples and bad barrels results in organizational cynicism, which
is explored in Chapter 7 by authors from the US Air Force Academy.
While the chapters provide multiple perspectives of negative
leadership, readers would have been better served by a concluding
chapter from the editors with their assessment and derived insights. As
such, the existing volume is an interesting and informative collection
of papers, representative of the IMLAW, but without synthesis. This
reviewer ponders questions that were not addressed by the editors. Are the
constructs of leadership as presented in the 2004 Global Leadership and
Organizational Behavior Experiment study useful for the examination
of negative leadership? More importantly, are there cultural differences
in the perception of negative leadership among militaries?
The IMLAW does offer a valuable forum for military researchers
to examine in depth specific topics with implications for military
professions. The workshop’s past publications on strategic leadership
development (2007), military ethics (2010), and adaptive leadership
(2014) are important investigations and presentations of research
findings. Accordingly, Negative Leadership: International Perspectives is
essential reading for anyone who studies and seeks to understand the
practice of military leadership. Positive and negative leadership are two
sides of the same coin. While the profession of arms seeks to promote
positive leadership as the vehicle to serve its stakeholders (i.e., its
governments and citizens), the military has the obligation to develop
institutional approaches to preclude or militate negative leadership in
its ranks.

